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ABSTRACT
Before making a security or privacy decision, Internet users should
evaluate several security indicators in their browser, such as the use
of HTTPS (indicated via the lock icon), the domain name of the
site, and information from extended validation certificates. How-
ever, studies have shown that human subjects infrequently employ
these indicators, relying on other indicators that can be spoofed and
convey no cryptographic assurances. We identify four simple secu-
rity indicators that accurately represent security properties of the
connection and then examine 125 popular websites to determine if
the sites’ designs result in correctly displayed security indicators
during login. In the vast majority of cases, at least some security
indicators are absent or suboptimal. This suggests users are becom-
ing habituated to ignoring recommended security indicators.
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INTRODUCTION
Users on the Internet are regularly confronted with complex se-
curity decisions that can affect their privacy. They must decide
whether it is safe to enter their username, password, credit card
details, and other personal information on websites with very dif-
ferent interfaces and only a few visual clues on whether it is safe to
do so. These security indicators include the protocol used, the do-
main name, the SSL certificate, and visual elements in the browser
window. Very few users understand the technical details of these
various indicators. Not surprisingly, users often get it wrong, either
ignoring security checks completely or misunderstanding them.
We begin by identifying four security indicators, present in all ma-
jor web browsers, that together convey strong security assurances.
We then examine 125 top websites, including major banks in sev-
eral countries, to ascertain the security indicators present at log in.
We find that the login interaction sequence for the vast majority
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of sites results in missing or incorrect security indicators. While
several studies have evaluated whether users correctly use security
indicators, there has been no work investigating why that is so. Our
data supports the hypothesis that users do poorly at understanding
security indicators because they are effectively trained to do so by
website designers. Ours is the first study assessing a variety of se-
curity indicators on popular websites from this perspective.
SSL/TLS AND SECURITY INDICATORS
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol was proposed in 1995
by Netscape for securing web and Internet traffic; later versions of
SSL were renamed the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol,
and here we refer to them interchangeably. The use of TLS to se-
cure web content delivered by the HyperText Transport Protocol
(HTTP) is commonly referred to as the HTTPS protocol.
TLS provides confidentiality, message integrity, and entity authen-
tication. Typically, authentication is based on public key certifi-
cates which are issued by a certificate authority (CA) and which
bind an identifier – typically a domain name – to a public key.
Before issuing a certificate, a CA is often presumed to perform
some offline validation checks to confirm the entity requesting the
certificate is legitimately related to the domain name in question.
Recently, CAs have started issuing extended validation (EV) cer-
tificates which, in theory, have a more thorough validation process
(and, in practice, cost more). Nonetheless, there is debate over
the effectiveness of EV certificates and whether they achieve their
goals.1
When a user’s web browser establishes a TLS connection with a
website, the browser performs a number of checks on the website’s
certificate (for example, it matches the website’s domain name, is
signed by a CA the user’s web browser trusts, and has not expired).
Once the checks pass and a connection is successfully established,
web browsers typically display additional information when com-
municating with sites using TLS. These are referred to as security
indicators.2 Internet security recommendations from companies
and governments typically advise users to check for these security
indicators before entering sensitive personal information.
We reviewed the academic literature and security recommendations
from online businesses to identify potential security indicators. We
identified the following four security indicators that are actually
indicative of the strong security offered by HTTPS/TLS.
1For example, one of the sites in our study had an EV certificate
issued to a company with the very descriptive name “Various Inc.”
2We exclude TLS-related warnings, such as expired certificates or
unknown CAs, from the definition of security indicators. We only
include indicators present after the TLS connection is established.
SI1. Does the URL in the location bar begin with https? [12, 13,
9, 3, 4]
SI2. Is the domain name of the URL in the location bar correct?
[16, 14, 15]
SI3. Is the lock icon displayed somewhere in the browser chrome
(the non-content part of the browser window, such as the
toolbar, status bar, title bar, or location bar)? [16, 12, 13,
9, 3, 15, 4]
SI4. Are there indicators present for an extended validation cer-
tificate, such as a green background in the location bar and
the name of the company on the certificate? [10]
However, many studies have shown that users do not properly check
these recommended security indicators.
Firstly, users often ignore the recommended security indicators.
Whalen and Inkpen [16] used eye tracking data to find that users
frequently look at the lock icon during log in but stop looking for
security information after logging in. Schechter et al. [12] removed
security indicators from financial websites but all 63 users in their
study continued to enter their password. Sobey et al. [13] found
(using eye tracking data) that indicators associated with EV certifi-
cates did not change user behaviour very much, even though they
are purported to offer better authentication promises. Sunshine et
al. [14] observed that around 30% of users ignore TLS warnings for
expired certificates, unknown CAs, and domain name mismatches,
and a majority do not understand these warnings.
Secondly, users often incorrectly use non-secure properties of web
pages to make security decisions. Dhamija and Tygar [6] found
that users cannot reliably distinguish browser chrome from web
page contents, so they often consider images displayed on a web
page to be trustworthy. This is troubling considering the threat of
visual spoofing [1] in which a web page disables certain parts of
the browser chrome (such as the location bar) and replaces those
regions with spoofed HTML versions that display misleading infor-
mation (such as a fake location bar with a falsified domain name).
Users also have been reported to make decisions based on the type
of site [9, 16], the type of information being submitted [9, 16], and
text on the page that says the site is secure [16]. It is of significant
concern that some design literature [7, §5.2.1] recommends the use
of design elements that “maximise perceived trustworthiness” but
in fact further conflate where to look for security indicators.
Some websites have deployed site authentication images, which are
custom images, selected by users at registration time, that are dis-
played to users with the recommendation that users stop if they do
not see the correct site authentication images. Unfortunately, site
authentication images have no real security: they offer no crypto-
graphic security properties and are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle
attacks. Schechter et al. [12] found that 92% of users proceeded
even when their site authentication image was absent. Most dis-
turbingly, some of the users in that study admitted to ignoring TLS-
related warnings because site authentication images were present.
We note a contrast between our work, which evaluates the presence
of security indicators on popular websites, and a recent survey [4],
which evaluates password login practices on popular websites.
STUDY OVERVIEW
We constructed a list of popular websites consisting of:
• the top 110 domain names by traffic, as ranked by Alexa Top-
sites3 [2], excluding country-specific duplicates (e.g., after
3One limitation of the Alexa Topsites data is that it ranks the most
frequently visited websites, not the most frequently logged-in-to
using google.com, exclude google.co.uk) but including dis-
tinct properties or brands (e.g., still include youtube.com),
• the top 10 banks in the USA [8], the “big 4” banks in the UK
and Australia, and the “big 5” banks in Canada, and
• the top 4 North American webmail providers (Yahoo, Mi-
crosoft, Google, and AOL).
Over a two-week period in September 2009, we visited each site
to determine the security indicators present when users attempt to
login to the site. Our experimental procedure was as follows:
1. Clear all user data (cache, cookies); restart the web browser
(Mozilla Firefox 3.5).4
2. Visit the site by typing the domain name as listed in the Alexa
Topsites ranking and hitting enter.
3. Find the page containing the login form, first by looking on
the front page of the site, and then looking for “Log in”
or “Sign in” links. (For 34 pages not in English, we used
Google Translate to help us find links to the login form.) Stop
if no login is found.
4. Record data about the login page: the URL, presence of the
location bar, protocol of the page (HTTP or HTTPS), use of
EV certificates, protocol of the login form submission, and
presence of lock icons on the page or as the favicon.
Of the 137 websites we visited, 12 provided no method for logging
in and are excluded from the rest of this study. We classified the
types of the remaining 125 sites in Table 1.
Type of site Examples n
bank bankofamerica.com, anz.com 23
blogging / hosting blogger.com, wordpress.com 10
content youtube.com, wikipedia.org 17
corporate microsoft.com, adobe.com 4
e-commerce ebay.com, amazon.com 6
file sharing flickr.com, rapidshare.com 8
mail mail.yahoo.com, hotmail.com 5
pornography 7
portal / search google.com, yahoo.com 29
social networking facebook.com, myspace.com 16
Table 1: Classification of sites visited.
MISUSE OF SECURITY INDICATORS
We identified a number of web page design characteristics that
make it hard to correctly evaluate the recommended security in-
dicators. This misuse of security indicators is discussed in detail in
the remainder of this section and summarized in Table 2.
Misused security indicator n
HTTP login page with HTTPS form submission 19
Lock icon on page or as favicon 29
Hidden location bar 2
Mismatched domain name 16
Very complicated URL 53
Table 2: Summary of observations.
websites. For example, Wikipedia is 6th on the list but few users
log in to Wikipedia; on the other hand, Facebook is 2nd on the list
and one cannot use Facebook without logging in. While a dataset
reflecting the most frequently logged-in-to websites would be very
helpful, we do not know of one.
4Although different browsers display security indicators slightly
differently, they do display effectively the same security indicators,
so our choice of browser does not affect the experimental results.
HTTP login page with HTTPS submission
For SI1 and SI3 to be satisfied, the login page and all elements on
the page must be delivered using HTTPS. For the user’s credentials
to be protected, the login form must submit the data using HTTPS.
We recorded in Table 3 the protocol used to deliver the login page
and compared it with the protocol with which the login form data
was submitted.
Login page Form submission n
HTTP
HTTP 56
HTTPS 13
HTTPS w/EV cert. 6
HTTPS HTTPS 40
HTTPS w/EV cert. HTTPS w/EV cert. 10
Table 3: Protocol of login page compared to form submission.
Of course the most troubling piece of data is that 45% of sites sub-
mitted usernames and passwords with no encryption whatsoever.
Several sites (19, or 15%) delivered the login page over HTTP but
submitted the login form using HTTPS. While it is good that these
sites protect user data in transit, users do not know this a priori
unless they view the HTML source of the page. Thus, a security-
conscious user should not login to these sites, even though the login
details will probably be protected. Troublingly, Facebook (the 2nd
ranked site on Alexa Topsites) follows this practice.
In some cases this design decision can be understood since the login
form appears on the main page and delivering the main page over
HTTPS may result in an unacceptably high server load. However,
for other sites, such as Facebook, the only purpose of displaying
the main page is to display the login form which might as well
have been delivered over HTTPS since the typical user’s next ac-
tion (logging in) will result in an HTTPS connection anyway, and
HTTPS connections can be reused over subsequent requests.
Curiously, 6 of these 19 sites have an EV certificate; since the main
purpose of EV certificates is to provide additional security indica-
tors in the browser, it is surprising that website designers purchased
an EV certificate at greater cost but do not deliver login pages uti-
lizing these additional security indicators. We also note that only
13% of the sites used EV certificates in any way.
Two sites allowed users to choose on the login page whether to
submit the form via HTTP or HTTPS. One site delivered the main
page over HTTP but the login form on the main page was included
via an <iframe> from an HTTPS URL; this does not result in any
security indicators being displayed.
Lock icon on page or as favicon
Users are accustomed to looking for a lock (or key) icon to check
if the page is secure. In particular, users should check for the lock
icon in the browser chrome (SI3), not in the content delivered by
the web page. Unfortunately, studies have shown users have trou-
ble distinguishing content from browser chrome [6]. To help users
avoid confusion, good website design would preclude the use of
lock icons in web page content. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Of the sites we surveyed, 15% displayed a lock icon on HTTPS
pages and an additional 5% displayed a lock icon even on HTTP
pages. Notably, 70% of banks displayed a lock icon on pages. This
may be related to studies which show that users have greater trust in
sites that display statements about the use of SSL, but exacerbates
the problem of users conflating trusted and untrusted content.
Most browsers allow websites to display an icon in the location bar
or tab bar; this is referred to as the favicon since it is stored when
users add the page as a bookmark/favourite. While supplied by the
website, it is displayed in areas that are conceptually part of the
browser chrome, not web page content. We observed 2 sites (both
run by AOL) used a key for the favicon when on HTTPS pages.
Hidden location bar
In order to evaluate SI1 (a URL beginning with https) and SI2 (the
domain name in the URL being correct), users must examine the
URL in the location bar. In all major browsers the site cannot hide
the location bar in the main window. However, the window.open
Javascript function does allow a web page to open new windows
with the location bar hidden. (Although Google Chrome and recent
versions of Mozilla Firefox no longer allow this.) With the location
bar hidden, the user cannot evaluate SI1 or SI2, and an attacker
could employ visual spoofing to construct a fake location bar.
Of the 125 sites we surveyed, only 2 employed a login method
involving a popup window with a hidden location bar. Curiously,
both of these sites were Australian banks, suggesting the possibility
of some hidden factor leading to this design (a common subcontrac-
tor designed the websites? industry recommendations?).
Further, the security guidelines of one of these banks [3] provides
incorrect recommendations for assessing SI1 and SI2, suggesting
a misunderstanding of security principles by the website designer.
It recommends checking for the website address as displayed in
the title bar of the popup window. This recommendation rests on
the fact that some browsers display the URL in the title bar if the
HTML page has no <title> tag specified, but is easily spoofed
by an attacker who specifies a <title> tag of their choice.
Mismatched domain name
For SI2, users are supposed to check if the domain name of the
URL in the location bar is correct. This helps avoid phishing and
redirection attacks. However, what does “correct” mean? One mea-
sure of correctness is whether the domain name of the login page
matches the domain name that the user typed. They may differ if
the user follows a link or is redirected to another page.
We visited each website by typing in the domain name as found
on the Alexa Topsites list (e.g., google.com). We compared the
domain name of the login page to the domain name we typed, and
recorded in Table 4 whether it was an exact match (we allowed the
site to prepend the string www. since the use of this prefix is nearly
ubiquitous), a close match (login.yahoo.com is a close match for
yahoo.com), or no match.
Match? Example typed domain→ login domain n
Exact match google.com→ www.google.com 71
Close match yahoo.com→ login.yahoo.com 38
No match hotmail.com→ login.live.com 16
Table 4: Mismatches of typed domain name vs. login page do-
main name.
The majority of “no match” cases were sites owned by parent cor-
porations but using separate branding for the site; for example,
Flickr is owned by Yahoo! and uses Yahoo!’s single sign-on via
login.yahoo.com. Other non-matching sites were banks. For exam-
ple, the Royal Bank of Scotland (rbs.co.uk) has its login page on
www.rbsdigital.com. Even though users are redirected by clicking
on a link on the main page, they can still be tricked if the main web
page is not delivered via HTTPS (it was not) or if the users do not
verify the main page’s authenticity before clicking on the link.
Complicated URL
Web design experts have long viewed the URL as a form of user
interface [11] and eyetracking research confirms that users look at
URLs frequently [5].
Since SI1 and SI2 involve reviewing the URL in the location bar,
and in particular the first part of the URL (the protocol and domain
name), a complex of the URL can make it harder for for users to
make correct security decisions. We recorded the full URL of each
login page and developed three classifications of complexity:
1. Simple URL: just the domain name; for example, https://www
.chase.com/. n = 50, average URL length 21.9.
2. Medium complexity URL: one short path component after
the domain name; e.g., https://www.blogger.com/start.
n = 22, average URL length 32.9.
3. Very complicated URL: lots of characters after the domain
name; for example, the login page for youtube.com had the
224-character URL https://www.google.com/accounts/Servic
eLogin?uilel=3&service=youtube&passive=true&continue=htt
p%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fsignin%3Faction_hand
le_signin%3Dtrue%26nomobiletemp%3D1%26hl%3Den_US
%26next%3D%252F&hl=en_US&ltmpl=sso (this was not even
the longest login URL we saw!).
n = 53, average URL length 110.1.
The average length of URLs in our study was 56.9 characters; the
average length of domain names we typed was 10.9 characters (22.9
characters including the prefix https://www.).
Good web browser design can help here: Google Chrome, for ex-
ample, displays the domain name in black but the rest of the URL
in grey, thereby emphasizing the domain name.
Site authentication images
We identified only 3 uses of site authentication images in the login
process, all of which were on sites run by Yahoo!. They displayed
the image on the login page which asked for both the username and
password. The image was computer-specific.
Seven banks had a multi-stage login procedure, with a first screen
asking for a username and then a second screen asking for a pass-
word. Some of these sites may be designed to display a site au-
thentication image if the user has one registered for that username;
since we did not have usernames at any of these banks, we could
not determine if this was the case.
DISCUSSION AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
Of the 125 sites we evaluated, only 5 avoided all misleading secu-
rity indicators identified in the previous section. Hence, a typical
Internet user will, much more often than not, be asked to make se-
curity decisions against best-practice recommendations on security
indicators. User education is often identified as a method for in-
creasing security. This paper shows how users are being educated,
through daily web use, to ignore recommended security indicators.
If we want users to learn to engage appropriately with security in-
dicators, we need websites where the interaction sequence ensures
proper display of security indicators. We encourage website de-
signers to follow these recommendations:
• Deliver the page containing the login form over HTTPS.
• Don’t try to hide the location bar.
• Ensure the domain name of the login page matches the do-
main name of the site in question.
• Don’t use lock icons anywhere in the web page content.
• Try to use simple URLs, especially for the login page.
We note that our third recommendation conflicts with single sign-
on systems. Given the increasing prevalence of such systems, we
believe an important piece of future work is understanding how
users assess the redirections and security of single sign-on systems.
This study aimed to determine which security indicators are dis-
played by popular websites. It remains an important task to de-
sign and evaluate better ways for web browsers to display security
indicators, including whether browsers should continue to display
untrusted favicons in areas considered part of the trusted chrome.
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